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Abstract. This paper is an attempt to theoretically describe the development and transformation 
of the ideas of French philosopher Michel Foucault whose work on body, disease and mental 
illness provide a basis for an advanced approach in the philosophy of medicine. The aim of the 
research is to understand on the basis of the theoretical review of Foucault’ s works and 
secondary literature the evolution of the reasoning on pathology in different works by the 
French author. In the first part of the paper we describe how Foucault came to the idea that 
psychiatric and organic must be treated as completely different. In the second part, we ad more 
sociocultural context and discuss Foucault’s ideas in the perspective of developing modernity. 
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Introduction 
 
In the late 1940ies and early 1950ies, during his studies and early lecturing 
at the École Normale Supérieure the famous French poststructuralist philosopher 
Michel Foucault was deeply interested in history of psychology, but also the 
clinical psychology and psychiatry of his time. It was the time before he started 
his structural analysis of society and before his different “archaeologies”, when 
he (shortly a member of the Communist party) developed his view on mental 
illness in the work that was first entitled “Mental Illness and Personality” that 
included also a part on Pavlov’s reflex theory. Back then Foucault’s theoretical 
approach was based on phenomenology and was inspired by his professor 
Maurice Merleau–Ponty and Martin Heidegger. He believed in unity and 
experience of personality. But until next edition and success of this work, 
Foucault’s ideas changed. He developed a renewed version of the book with a 
new title “Mental Illness and Psychology” and with another view with no integrity 
of personality.  
The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the evolution of the reasoning on 
pathology in different works by Michel Foucault. We used as a method the 
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hermeneutic interpretation of the Foucault’s texts and secondary literature in 
connection to wider cultural, social and historical context. 
 
Literature review 
 
Foucault's analysis of mental disorders shows that the historical evolution of 
the medical discourse as a whole (and psychiatric knowledge particularly) 
is rooted in "mythology" of organic pathology: psychiatric knowledge and organic 
hypothesis both do the distribution of symptoms by pathological groups and try 
to isolate large pathological units by using the same methods. And behind this 
unified methodology there are two postulates about the nature of the disease: 
1. Initially it is postulated that the disease is essence, specific unity and all 
the symptoms are presenting it.  
2. At the same time disease is dependent on them and to some extent 
independent from them. In psychiatry it describes the schizophrenic 
basis lurking behind obsessive symptoms and talks about masked 
delirium and the presence of manic-depressive psychosis in manic 
crises or depression episodes. In his most early work Foucault claims 
that concept "mental illness" is simply the wrong use of metaphor 
borrowed from organic pathology domain. He writes: "My aim is to 
show that mental pathology requires methods of analysis different from 
those of organic pathology and that it is only by an artifice of language 
that the same meaning can be attributed to "illnesses of the body" and 
"illnesses of the mind"" (Foucault, 1987, 10). 
Foucault does not deal with the problems of the origin of medical discourse, 
just as he is not interested in the history of the concept of disease. This is 
unfortunate, since the most ancient nosological (nowadays: the branch of medical 
science dealing with the classification of diseases) treatises (Hippocrates, Galen, 
Avicenna) could not be treatises on medicine in our understanding, and even could 
not be tractates on diseases in general. They could only be descriptions of certain 
pathologies within the existence of the human organism. 
Medicine in general like those early nosological tractates’ claims to gain 
knowledge about human. And the most ancient object of consideration of 
medicine is the human body. 
The body is given to medicine only as a sick body i.e. body with pathology, 
since medicine has nothing to say about a healthy body, and only a disease allows 
medicine to exist. That is, it turns out that a living and healthy body for medicine 
does not exist at all, because medicine cannot say anything about it while 
remaining medicine. 
It can be assumed that the body appears to be the surest way to localize pain, 
that is,  the body  appears in discourse only as a place to  designate and  describe
 
SOCIETY. INTEGRATION. EDUCATION 
Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference. Volume IV, May 24th -25th, 2019. 174-182 
 
 
 
176 
 
pain (the question “Where does it hurt?” replaced the question “What's wrong 
with you?” that could be the main question of psychiatric knowledge), that is 
understood by the term "localization". 
Along with this biased view about the presence of the specific nature of the 
disease, and as if in order to compensate for such super-abstraction- another 
notion is introduced – one of naturalistic postulate; which describes a disease as a 
natural specie behind the polymorphic volumes of each taxonomic group as the 
unity of the species: so, early dementia appears as a species characterized by a 
return to earlier forms of natural evolution and having hebephrenic, catatonic or 
paranoid invariants.  
Thus, if parallelism existed between the psychic and organic branches of 
psychopathology, then this occurred not only by the reasoning on the presence of 
a certain idea of human integrity and psycho-physiological parallelism, but also 
due to recognition of both of these two postulates concerning nature of the disease. 
If mental illness appears in the medical discourse by using the same 
conceptual methods as in the description of organic life and psychological 
symptoms' analysis tend to share common ground and connect in the same manner 
as organic then it is because there is tendency to treat the disease (mental or 
organic) as natural entity that manifests itself through the specific symptoms. 
Those two forms of pathology, therefore, have no real unity. This pseudo-unity 
arises only via the help of these two postulates and abstract parallelism. Therefore 
there is conceptual problem of human psycho- somatic integrity that persists. 
This problem directed the study of pathologies to new methods and new 
concepts. The concept of organic and psychological unity leads to the rejection of 
those postulates that turn the disease into a specific essence. The disease ceases 
to be independent reality and refuses to play the role of the natural species or 
foreign body behind symptoms or organism itself. On the contrary, respect is 
given to the general reactions of the individual that are located between the 
sickness processes and general functioning of the body. Disease no longer fit 
between them like an autonomous reality. It is impossible to continue think about 
illness as an abstract gap or residue in individual becoming sick. 
In the second edition of the Foucault’s book "Maladie mentale et 
personnalite" (The Mental Illness and Personality) the title appears slightly 
changed to "The Mental Illness and psychology". In this newest version concept 
"natural species" is substituted with “botanical species” This “botanical view” is 
the echo of Foucault's stay in Uppsala‚ where he was writing "The History of 
Madness"- book that made him famous, and in free time used to walk near the 
house of Karl Linnaeus, located near Uppsala.  
The treatment of madness as a botanic gaze appears in "The History of 
Madness", where it indicates that in the 18th century, approach "described by 
botanists order becomes an organizing principle for the world of pathology as a 
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whole; diseases are no longer distributed in the space of the mind itself and in 
accordance with its order. The idea of this “botanic garden”, where to 
accommodate along with various kinds of plants also various types of pathologies, 
belonged to the wise and divine providence" (Foucault, 2006, 188). He does not 
leave this topic and in later lectures on "Psychiatric Power," where he recalls the 
psychiatric hospital of the 19th century “The place of diagnosis and classification, 
botanical greenhouse in which the types of diseases are distributed as if in a large 
vegetable-ground ...” (Foucault, 2007, 402). 
Most medical scientists are concerned with the fact that in psychiatry - the 
main diagnostic method is the clinical method and not the laboratory method. That 
implies the subjectivity of observation that is incompatible with positive science 
and opens a vast space for fantasy and commerce (which, in particular, brings it 
closer to psychology). 
For Foucault in his work "The Birth of Clinic" (Foucault, 1976) where he 
examines the origins of medical discourse and the historical construction of 
clinical method- "body" and "disease" are two concepts that complement each 
other. That is, if we define a disease as a certain pathology of the body, then we 
will not be able to identify the body, but the most interesting thing is different: if 
we define the body as the location of the disease, then the disease will be 
indefinable for us. Some discourses, in particular those that Foucault implies, have 
as their goal the attainment of some positive knowledge. Therefore, Foucault 
believes that a positive discourse about the body is intended to simply objectify 
pain. 
 
Research results and discussion 
 
Michel Foucault is, of course, one of the most careful observers - a serious 
investigator of rationality, forms of consciousness, mind and its inversion - 
madness. Distinguished Russian philosopher Vladimir Bibihin in his work "The 
new renaissance'" writes about Foucault who warned, that it is so hard to restore 
some of the renaissance world feelings. It needs to break, as a plaster mask on 
ones' own face, the usual mechanisms of manipulative thinking (the concept 
introduced for this phenomena by Foucault based on his mentor Jean Hyppolite's 
Hegelian interpretation of “objective” is "apparatuses") through which the outer 
world feels like an object collector. No research, no restoration of historical 
accuracy, no science progressed Foucault more than anything, neither 
rehabilitation of insanity and sex, nor criticism and reform of the medical and 
prison system itself, but a very personal thing: “First of all, but afterwards - 
inviting others, experience in going through certain historical content, in our 
present existence… it is to test our modernity to such an extent that it comes out 
of this experience transformed” (Trombadori, 1981, 21; Quoted as in Бибихин, 
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1998, 152). Not to philosophize, but to "experience a direct, personal experience 
of being" by studying logically-rational constructs only to "divide them" and 
through them, behind the frames, to mute in the alarming expansion of pre-
categorical life. Such a frontier experience should also “distinguish” the subject, 
“take it out of yourself” (Bartolommei, 1983, 48; Quoted as in Бибихин, 1998, 
153). Foucault analysed the discourse-personal ideological mechanisms - to better 
understand the primacy of the unique, unprotected, direct feeling. Human is 
surviving animal, animal experiens. Far from experience, resilient here and now, 
everything is abstract and deafening. It is criminal to suppress the life of the 
vulnerable by the plans of trust or even the hope of saving the soul in the future. 
What the minute of existence will bring is also valuable; for the purpose is 
gathered in that which is unexpectedly revealed to mind and heart. “Each 
experience is the decisive experience in which we, as we say, are lost in salvation 
or salvation; the third is not given” (Бибихин, 1998, 153). It is, in this case, that 
it is about to make it visible and pronounced. It is possible that this is what he has 
in mind when he warns us: "We must place ourselves, and remain once and for 
all, at the level of the fundamental spatialisation and verbalization of the 
pathological, where the loquacious gaze with which the doctor observes the 
poisonous heart of things is born and communes with itself" (Foucault, 1976, XII). 
Foucault begins his hermeneutical analysis of the subject in the work “The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject” (Фуко, 1991) with a glimpse into the history of 
philosophy: Plato's "Alkibiados" dialogue focuses on caring for himself 
(epimeleia) - an element characteristic of Greek and Roman philosophical 
thought. This principle involves three aspects - the view of the world, the view of 
yourself, and the activity (most often - transformative) that the subject carries out 
with himself. In a platonic sense, the epimeleia is, first and foremost, the concern 
for its divine and immortal soul, where ascetic corporeal self-discipline is 
important. 
Corporeality is what gives the opportunity to start talking about the body, 
that is, to introduce the body into one or another discourse. Or otherwise, 
corporeality is a place for the body in discourse, that is, corporeality determines 
when it is appropriate to talk about the body. 
In his "The Hermeneutics of the Subject", Michel Foucault indicates that the 
paradigm shift that characterizes modernity is one in which thinking becomes 
separated from the transformation technologies of self, or where mastery of the 
world no longer directs self-evolving changes in the cognitive subject. 
Postmodernism, according to the vast majority of cultural and identity studies, 
proves to be rationally rigid prescriptions in a system built for modernity in 
opposition frameworks, thus describing self as flexible, open, socially constructed 
and constantly changing entity, often freely interacting with the external physical 
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and social environment, including the requirement to return to "roots" and 
traditions. 
In describing the subject's hermeneutics, Michel Foucault specifically 
releases a Cartesian paradigm shift that introduces new times, or modernity, when 
the cognition is separated from the technology of self-transformation, or when the 
path of truth cognition no longer leads to self-transformation. In modernity, as the 
era of the new subject and the relationship of truth, knowledge accumulates in an 
objectivized social process, where the subject acts in one direction, because the 
truth no longer interacts with the change of the subject's existence. 
In the description of the ascetic practice of self-creation within modernity in 
Foucault's question, "What is Enlightenment? refers to the Baudlaire postulates 
the difference between a psycho-geographically floating flâneur and a dandy: 
“Being modern does not mean accepting itself as a stream of abandoned outgoing 
moments; it means to perceive yourself as a complex and difficult-to-develop 
object: it is called bodybuilding "dandysme" in that time". (Fuko, 1996, 169) 
Dandy in a solipsistic manner forms his own individual subjectivity in mass 
society (modernism), while flâneur is already part of a liquid modernity of flows 
where subjectivity dissolves on the trajectory of motion. 
In turn, Foucault claims that in postmodern existence the standard of living 
is what used to be the object of criticism for stoic philosophers: Seneca's stultitia 
is 1) openness to external influences, non-critical perception, confusion of 
objective notions with experiences and other subjective elements; 2) Rods are the 
one who is scattered over time and allows himself to be seduced, captivated, he 
has left his life in the air and does not move his will to any purpose. Such a life 
flows in a selfless and unconscious way - that is, without will, constantly changing 
its direction. The will is not absolute, but is dependent on changes in perceptions, 
occasional events and tendencies. In turn, absolute and free will is a desire without 
inertia and laziness. Relative, limited and fragmented variable will is separated 
from self as it is ideal: it is stultitia. 
From the Hegelian idea of the philosophy of conscientious "time spirit" 
(Zeitgeist) and the philosophy of the whole mental paradigm, the concept of "total 
conception of ideology" of Karl Manheim (Mannheim, 2013) grows out of 
importance in the "false consciousness" problem. Speaking of total ideology (as 
opposed to partial), it comes when an epistemological approach is analysed, its 
objective structure forming its internal structure, in the expression of Manheim - 
when the "morphological" or structural-analytical "relationship of social existence 
and cognition forms" is revealed. In contrast, the study of partial ideology is 
"functionalization at a psychological level". The latter deals with psychology of 
interest and social psychology because the subject's (both collective and 
individual) ideas are viewed as functions of his social existence. The study of total 
ideology does not take place on a psychological but epistemic level, i.e. 
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encompassing the specifics of the existing level of society development. The total 
ideology of this research is essential as the cultural landscape of successive phases 
of capitalist development, or Max Weber's "ethos", which is different, for 
example, in a consumer society or an information economy. Foucault like Karl 
Manheim speaks of "total conception of ideology" in the structuralist terms as 
specific forms of rationality or historically changing episthemes. According to 
Foucault, who introduced the "historical a-priori" construct in the changing 
systems of reasoning, that forms various discourses differently in each epoch 
linking "Words and Things" ("Les Mots et les choses" (1966) - the title of the one 
of his most popular books translated into English as “The Order Of Things. An 
Archaeology Of The Human Sciences” (Foucault, 1970)) the relation between the 
visible and invisible— which is necessary to all concrete knowledge— changed 
its structure, revealing through gaze and language what had previously been 
below and beyond their domain. A new alliance was forged between words and 
things, enabling one to see and to say (Foucault, 1976). 
The turning point of the epistemic shift (for Manheim: "total conception of 
ideology") is the Great French revolution, which results in the normalization of 
change, innovation, transformation and even revolution in the modern political 
arena. Political ideologies are just one of the ways in which this socio-
psychological normalization - the emergence of human sciences itself - following 
the "archaeology of human sciences" initiated by Michel Foucault illustrates the 
change of these episthemes. 
Since most of Foucault’s legacy is devoted to the thematisation of the 
mentioned “to see and to say” problem, medicine is a fairly convenient example 
of the localization of this problem. Medicine is a kind of field where the gaze is 
identical with the act of appointing meaning, the body is the place where the image 
is identical with the word, where you can talk about the visible, the body is only 
a tool for speaking, something that gives rise to conversation, making 
conversation possible in general. This does not mean that one can speak only with 
the help of the body in the vocal-phonetic aspect, but the body itself provides a 
certain alphabet, something to which signs can be attributed: "The gaze is no 
longer reductive, it is, rather, that which establishes the individual in his 
irreducible quality. And thus it becomes possible to organize a rational language 
around it" (Foucault, 1976, XIV). 
In the analysis of medical gaze that forms the clinical method Foucault 
involves the semiotic attributes of signified/signifier as well as dramatization 
theory: "Eighteenth century transcribed the double reality, natural and dramatic, 
of disease, establishing the truth of a corpus of knowledge and the possibility of 
its application. A happy, calm structure, in which a balance was struck between 
the Nature-Death system, with visible forms taking root in the invisible, and the 
Time-Outcome system, which anticipated the invisible by means of a visible 
 
Kozlovs & Skulte, 2019. The Evolution of Foucault's Reasoning on Pathology 
 
 
 
 
181 
 
mapping out (repérage). Both these systems existed for themselves; their 
difference is a fact of nature to which medical perception adapted itself, but which 
it did not constitute. The formation of the clinical method was bound up with the 
emergence of the doctor’s gaze into the field of signs and symptoms. The 
recognition of its constituent rights involved the effacement of their absolute 
distinction and the postulate that henceforth the signifier (sign and symptom) 
would be entirely transparent for the signified, which would appear, without 
concealment or residue, in its most pristine reality, and that the essence of the 
signified - the heart of the disease - would be entirely exhausted in the intelligible 
syntax of the signifier” (Foucault, 1976, 92). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Before his fame that came with the book “The Birth of Clinic” first book by 
Foucault “The Mental Illness and Personality” illustrates the transition of the 
author from phenomenological approach to the structuralism in the analysis of 
pathology. From the first edition he takes on the very idea that the pathology can 
not be conceptually used in description of mental phenomena. But later the view 
of the person is changed to the more socially and relationally based concept – an 
outcome of his structuralist and, later, poststructuralist analysis. 
In his later philosophical works throughout his life, Foucault is trying to 
understand and interpret the subject in the world - in the direct experience and 
social and cultural context - and place it in the vocabulary of philosophical 
writings. From the direct experience to the thinking that involves rigid opposition 
between subject and object and visible and invisible, and no longer directs self-
evolving changes in the cognitive subject in the modern era, and further to the 
postmodern conceptualizations of the self as flexible, open, socially constructed 
and constantly changing entity, interacting with the external physical and social 
environment – the writings by Michel Foucault follow the path of the evolution 
in thinking on pathology. 
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